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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Remainderman Not Entitled to Partition
The court, in Adkins v. Adkins," properly dismissed an action -by a re-
mainderman for partition. The Ohio statutes as construed by the Ohio
Supreme Court do not allow a remainderman to sue for partition because
he does not have seisin. However the owner of an undivided interest in
fee simple subject to an estate for years is entitled to partition because he
has seisin.10 Adkins v. Adkins overlooks this distinction and denies par-
tition at the request of a remainderman (who did not have seisin) because
he had neither possession nor the immediate right to possession.
ROBERT N. COOK
INSURANCE
Litigation in the area of insurance was unusually sparse in 1955 so-far
as the attention of the appellate courts of Ohio was concerned.
Ohio Revised Code section 3911.04 states that an insurance company
must provide a copy of "each application or other document" intended to
affect the validity of the policy. A company failing to do so is estopped to
deny the correctness of such document while in default and, failing to sup-
ply the copy within thirty days after the demand, is forever barred. Acacia
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Weissman' raised two questions of interpretation of
this statute. The policy in suit in that case had lapsed and been reinstated
upon deceased's application. No copy of this application had been re-
turned to deceased. Following the death of the insured the beneficiary re-
quested such copy which was provided her. The company sought cancella-
tion of the policy because of the alleged falsity of certain answers in the
application for reinstatement. The beneficiary answered and cross-
petitioned for payment of the policy. The Supreme Court of Ohio refused
to cancel the policy and affirmed the judgment that the beneficiary could
collect on the policy. First, the court rejected the company's claim that
the statute did not apply to an application for reinstatement on the basis of
the statutory language "each application or other document." Second, the
court held that providing the beneficiary with a copy upon her request
did not prevent the estoppel against the company. The court pointed out
that the express language of the statute 'is that the copy must be returned
.to any person taking such policy." The court then called attention to the
fact that one year and eight months passed between the reinstatement of
the policy and the assured's death during which time the copy was not
997 Ohio App. 185, 124 N.E.2d 179 (1954).
" Rawson v. Brown, 104 Ohio St. 537, 136 N.E. 209 (1922).
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furnished - as though this passage of time were decisive. It would seem
that passage of time, no matter how long, would only work an estoppel in
abatement which could be halted at any time by a furnishing of the necessary
copy. However, the court's end result can be sustained by the fact that the
statute required the copy to be returned to the "person taking such policy."
That person in this case is the deceased insured, and because of his death it
becomes factually impossible for the company to comply with the condi-
tions which would have prevented the estoppel.
In Heinze v. Eye,2 following recovery of a judgment against the de-
fendant for damages for wrongful death in an automobile accident, a sup-
plemental petition was filed against the defendant's insurance company to
recover from that company. The company denied that the defendant was
its insured. The defendant had asked an agent to obtain liability insurance
for him. Because of the defendant's age none of the companies which the
agent represented would -issue the insurance and the agent made applica-
tion under the Assigned Rtisk Plan. The risk was assigned to the company
here involved. The company wrote to the defendant stating that the com-
pany would not be bound until after receipt of the premium. The de-
fendant testified that this notice was never received by him, which testi-
mony the court accepted. The defendant gave a certified check to the
agent to be forwarded to the company. The agent at that time and in writ-
ing told defendant that he was covered. The defendant was involved in the
automobile accident, for which he was held responsible in the preliminary
action, before the check reached the company and before the policy was
issued. The company, unaware of the accident, did, however, proceed to
issue the policy. A West Virginia statute,a which is substantially the same
as Ohio General Code section 9586,4 provides that "Any person who shall
solicit an application for insurance shall ... be regarded as the agent of
the company and not the agent of the assured." In this situation the court
held the company liable. The agent, although a stranger to this conpany
at the time he assured the defendant that the risk was covered by this com-
pany, -became its agent by force of the statute when the policy was issued.
The company, having failed to communicate to the defendant its intention
as to the effective date of the policy or its intention as to limitation on the
authority of the agent, was bound by the apparent authority of the agent.
Plaintiff mortgaged his truck, and mortgagee obtained insurance, add-
ing the cost of the premium to the loan, which was thus paid by the
plaintiff. The mortgagee secured the information necessary to obtain the
1164 Ohio St. 82, 128 N.E.2d 34 (1955).
'97 Ohio App. 451, 127 N.E.2d 57 (1954).
3 W. VA. CODE § 3410 (1949).
'Now OHIo REv. CODE 5 3929.27.
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insurance from the plaintiff and forwarded it to the insurance company.
The company then issued the policy which was returned to the company's
regular agent for delivery to the insured. This course of conduct was a
common one between the mortgagee and the company. At the time the
loan was taken out a representative of the mortgagee assured the plaintiff
that his truck was fully covered, whereas, under the policy, use of the truck
was restricted to a radius of fifty miles. The truck was destroyed and on
request the company refused to pay because of violation of the fifty mile
use provision. The plaintiff contended that the mortgagee was an agent of
the company and that the full coverage representations constituted a waiver.
The trial court dismissed at the end of the plaintiff's case, and the appellate
court in Bright v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.5 affirmed. The result was based
on the ground that since the mortgagee was an insured it would be an in-
compatible position to regard it as also as agent of the company. The court
also notes the fact that mortgagee had no license to sell -insurance and that
one could not lawfully be granted to it to permit the type of business here
carried out. The plaintiff had urged Ohio General Code section 95866
on the court. The court in its opinion makes no direct statement as to
why that statute would not control, the implication being that the impro-
priety of the mortgagee being an agent prevented such application. The
use made of Ohio General Code section 9586 in this case by the Court of
Appeals of Franklin County should be carefully compared with the use
made of a substantially indentical West Virginia statute by that same
court of appeals in Heinze v. Eye7 which was discussed in the immedi-
ately preceding paragraph.
In Howell v. Frost8 a court of appeals rejected the argument that an
insurance company's defense of failure of cooperation by the insured in
an action on a supplemental petition was invalid when the company had
failed to notify the insured as to her position under the policy.
Green v. Acacia Mutual Life Ins. Co.9 concerned a suit on an insurance
policy which contained the usual provision that the policy must be delivered
during the "good health" of the proposed insured. The company defended
on the ground that the condition was not fulfilled. The court held that
this condition did not apply to ailments known to the insurer and be-
cause of the presence of which the insured was classified as a substandard
risk and a higher premium was paid.
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'98 Ohio App. 33, 128 N.E.2d 152 (1954).
Now OHIo REv. CODE § 3929.27.
797 Ohio App. 451, 127 N.E.2d 57 (1954).
s98 Ohio App. 127, 128 N.E.2d 189 (1954).
'98 Ohio App. 101, 128 N.E.2d 222 (1954).
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